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Using SOEP panel data and dierence-in-dierences methods, this study is the rst to
empirically evaluate the eectiveness of four dierent health care cost containment measures
within an integrated framework. The four measures investigated were introduced in Germany
in 1997 to reduce moral hazard and public health expenditures in the market for convalescent
care. Doubling the daily copayments was clearly the most eective cost containment measure,
resulting in a reduction in demand of about 20 percent. Indirect measures such as allowing
employers to cut statutory sick pay or paid vacation during health spa stays did not signicantly
reduce demand.
Keywords: health expenditures, cost containment measures, copayment, convalescent
care, SOEP
JEL classication: H51; I11; I18; J221 Introduction
For decades health expenditures have increased exponentially in most industrialized countries.
In the US, health spending increased a staggering 787 percent between 1980 and 2007. In
reunied Germany, health expenditures increased from 1992 to 2008 by 60 percent, consuming
more than 10 percent of GDP in 2010 (German Federal Statistical Oce, 2010). In light of
these gures, it is no surprise that rising health care costs are one of the most contentious issues
and a matter of great concern for policy makers worldwide.
Researchers have identied various key factors behind rising health expenditures, including
demographic change, increasing national incomes, and technological change. Newhouse (1992)
and Weisbrod (1991) are among the rst to identify technological change as the dominant
driving force, a conjecture that is dicult to empirically prove (Weisbrod, 1991; Newhouse,
1992; Okunade, 2004; Di Matteo, 2005; Civan and Koksal, 2010).
While the main causes of rising health expenditures seem clear, the question of how to
deal with them remains unresolved. There is an extremely wide variety of organizing health
care systems in dierent countries, but none of them have emerged with an optimal model. This
comes as no surprise if one thinks about the very dierent objectives that the dierent health care
systems are designed to achieve: reducing the burden on the social security system and taxpayers,
achieving equal access to care, providing universal coverage, avoiding state rationing, allowing
freedom to choose medical providers and insurance plans, or promoting medical progress, to
name just a few.
The literature analyzes the optimal organization of health care theoretically as well as em-
pirically, although the majority of work is theoretical in nature. Some attention is given to the
supply side, particularly to the question of how to optimally organize and nance a hospital
system with the aim of balancing quality of care against costs (Ellis and McGuire, 1996; Sloan
et al., 2001; Propper et al., 2004; Bazzoli et al., 2008). Analogously, the same question can be
raised for the outpatient sector and physicians (Mari~ noso and Jelovac, 2003; Dusheiko et al.,
2006; Karlsson, 2007). Especially in the US|a market still dominated by private health care
providers|there is considerable debate surrounding the question of whether Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) can help reduce health expenditures while maintaining quality (Goldman
et al., 1995; Hill and Wolfe, 1997; Keeler et al., 1998; Deb and Trivedi, 2009). In Europe, on
the other hand, key concerns revolve around issues of direct rationing (by public authorities)
and indirect rationing (through waiting times) (Propper et al., 2002; Schut and de Ven, 2005;
1Felder, 2008; Siciliani et al., 2009).
In the demand-side research, cost-sharing is identied as the main tool used to reduce moral
hazard and overconsumption of medical services (Pauly and Blavin, 2008; van Kleef et al.,
2009). In this strand of the literature, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) is still
the largest and most inuential health policy study to this day. In this 1970s era study, families
at six dierent sites in the US were randomly assigned to 14 dierent health insurance plans
with a varying degree of cost-sharing and observed for periods up to ve years (Manning et al.,
1987). Since then, a great amount of publications on the impact of cost-sharing on the demand
for medical care emerged from the HIE, most published in the 1980s (see Zweifel and Manning
(2000) for an overview). But apart from the HIE, there is only scant empirical evidence of
causal eects of cost-containment measures on the demand for health care. A handful of studies
empirically investigate how increased copayments aect the demand for doctor visits (Chiappori
et al., 1998; Voorde et al., 2001; Cockx and Brasseur, 2003; Winkelmann, 2004; Gern and
Schellhorn, 2006). Schrey ogg and Grabka (2010) analyze the eects of the copayments for
doctor visits introduced in Germany. Using a dierence-in-dierences setup, similar to the one
in this study, as well as the same dataset, they do not nd any signicant behavioral reactions
in the aftermath of the reform.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper evaluating the eectiveness of four
dierent cost containment measures within an integrated framework. In Germany, beginning
in 1997, various health reforms were implemented to reduce the demand for convalescent care.
Before the reforms went into eect, experts claimed that around a quarter of all convalescent
care therapies were unnecessary (Schmitz, 1996; Sauga, 1996). In 1995, 1.9 million patients
in Germany underwent convalescent care therapy and more than e7 billion (0.4 percent of
GDP) was spent on these programs (German Federal Statistical Oce, 2010). Ziebarth (2010)
shows that the price elasticity of demand for convalescent care treatments is inelastic and about
-0.4|an estimate that is very much in line with the consensus price elasticity estimates in the
literature on health care (Wedig, 1988; Keeler et al., 1988; Zweifel and Manning, 2000). Hence,
it is plausible to assume that convalescent care is a good proxy for health care in general.
The rst reform evaluated here doubled the daily copayments for convalescent care. The
second increased waiting times between two treatments and reduced the legally codied standard
length of the therapy. The third reform gave employers the right to deduct two days of paid
vacation for every ve days that employees were unable to work while in convalescent care. The
2fourth reform cut statutory sick pay from 100 to 80 percent of foregone gross wages during
convalescent care.
The rst two reforms only aected people insured under the German Mandatory Health
Insurance (MHI), while people insured under the second tier of the German health insurance
system|the Private Health Insurance (PHI)|were not aected. The other two reforms, which
concerned the cut in paid leave, only aected private-sector employees. Thus, I can dene various
subgroups that were aected dierently by the reforms. By means of conventional dierence-
in-dierences models and SOEP panel data, I then disentangle the causal eects of these cost
containment measures on the demand for convalescent care. One main objectives of this paper
is to evaluate the eectiveness of direct cost containment measures such as copayment increases,
which apply to the entire population, as compared to indirect measures such as decreasing legal
minimum requirements, which only increase employers' options to regulate work conditions at
the rm level.
My empirical results show that doubling the copayments was, by far, the most eective cost
containment instrument. It led to a signicant decrease in the demand for convalescent care
programs of about 20 percent. Moreover, evidence from administrative data suggests that the
reduction in the legally dened standard length of the therapies was eective in reducing the
average duration of treatments. However, I do not nd evidence that the cuts in paid leave
signicantly reduced the demand for convalescent care programs.
Based on administrative data, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that all reforms
jointly reduced annual public spending for convalescent care by e800 million or 13 percent.
Although the length of treatments decreased, the doubling of daily copayments raised additional
revenues of about e400 million per year.
In the next section, I describe some features of the German health care system and give
more details about the reform. In Section 3, the dataset and the variables used are explained,
and in the subsequent section, I specify my estimation and identication strategy. Estimation
results are presented in Section 5 and I conclude with Section 6.
2 The German Health Care System and the Policy Reforms
The German health care system is actually comprised of two independent health care systems
that exist side by side. The more important of the two is the Mandatory Health Insurance (MHI),
3which covers about 90 percent of the German population. Employees whose gross income from
salary is below a dened income threshold (in 2010, e49,950 per year) are compulsorily insured
under the MHI. High-income earners who exceed that threshold as well as self-employed people
have the right to choose between the MHI and private health insurance. Non-working spouses
and dependent children are covered at no cost by the MHI family insurance. Special regulations
apply to particular groups such as students and the unemployed, but most of these are MHI-
insured. Everyone insured under the MHI is subject to a generous universal benet package,
which is determined at the federal level and codied in the Social Code Book V (SGB V).
Coinsurance rates1 are prohibited in the MHI and thus, apart from copayments, health services
are fully covered. The MHI is one pillar of the German social security system (German Ministry
of Health, 2010).
The MHI is primarily nanced by mandatory payroll deductions that are not risk-related.
For people with gainful employment, these contributions are split equally between employer
and employee up to a contribution ceiling (2010: e45,000 per year). Despite several health
care reforms that tried to remedy the problem of rising health care expenditures, contribution
rates have risen from 12.6 percent in 1990 to 15.5 percent in 2011, mainly due to demographic
changes, medical progress, and system ineciencies (German Federal Statistical Oce, 2010).
The second track of the German health care system is Private Health Insurance (PHI). The
main groups of private insurance holders are private-sector employees above the aforementioned
income threshold, public-sector employees2, and the self-employed. Privately insured people
pay risk-related insurance premiums determined by an initial health checkup. The premiums
exceed the expected expenditures in younger age brackets, since health insurance providers
build up reserves for each insured person for rising expenditures with increased age. Coverage is
provided under a range of dierent health plans, and insurance contracts are subject to private
law. Consequently, in Germany, public health care reforms apply only to the MHI, not to the
PHI.
1 Coinsurance rates are important for private health insurance providers. They dier from copayments. While
a copayment is typically a xed amount that the insured person has to pay per day of treatment or for specic
medical devices or medications, a coinsurance rate denes a percentage of the costs that an insured person has
to pay when using the system. For example, private health insurance providers may oer 80/20 health plans
in which the insured person pays 20 percent of all costs incurred while the health insurance provider pays the
remaining 80 percent. Often, health insurance providers limit the total amount that an individual has to spend
out-of-pocket with a so-called coinsurance cap, which might be e2,000 per year.
2 We need to distinguish between two types of employees in the German public sector: rst, civil servants
with tenure (Beamte), henceforth called \civil servants," most of whom purchase PHI to cover the 50 percent
of health expenditures that the state does not reimburse (Beihilfe), and second, employees in the public sector
without legal tenure (Angestellte im  oentlichen Dienst), henceforth called \public servants," who receive some
additional benets but are mainly insured under the MHI (under the same conditions as everyone else).
4It is important to keep in mind that compulsorily insured persons have no right to choose the
health insurance system or benet package. They are compulsorily insured under the standard
MHI insurance scheme. Once an optionally insured person (a high-income earner, self-employed
person, or civil servant) opts out of the MHI system, it is practically impossible to switch back.
Employees above the income threshold are legally prohibited from doing so, while those who fall
below the income threshold in subsequent years may do so under certain conditions, but any
reserves that they have built up under PHI policies are not transferable (neither between PHI
and MHI, nor between dierent private health insurance providers).3 In reality, switching to a
private health insurance provider may be regarded as a lifetime decision, and switching between
the MHI system and PHI|as well as between PHI providers|is therefore very rare.
2.1 The German Market for Convalescent Care
In Europe, especially in Germany, there is a long tradition of health spa treatments to improve
poor health. Since the time of the Roman Empire, doctors have sent patients to \take the
waters" to recover from various disorders. In Germany, convalescent care treatments are usually
combined with various types of physical therapy, often including electrotherapy, massage, un-
derwater exercise, ultrasonic therapy, health and diet education, stress reduction therapy, and
cold and hot baths as well as mud packs. Convalescent care therapies require the patients to
follow a strict daily schedule.
The German MHI is one of the few health insurance systems worldwide that, apart from
small copayments, fully covers convalescent care therapies at health spas. It may therefore come
as no surprise that the German market for convalescent care is said to be the largest worldwide.
In 1995, a total of e7.646 billion was spent on convalescent care, accounting for more than 4
percent of all health expenditures in Germany. Around 1,400 medical facilities with 100,000
full-time (equivalent) sta members treated 1.9 million patients, who stayed an average of 31
days each (German Federal Statistical Oce, 2010).
Convalescent care therapy|referred to in Germany as a Kur or cure|requires a physician's
prescription, and the individual must submit an application for treatment to his or her MHI
sickness fund. The role of the patient in the application process is central. On the one hand,
well informed patients may push their doctors to recommend them for convalescent care, and
doctors may comply simply out of the fear of losing patients given the competition on the
3 Until 2009, accrued reserves for rising health expenditures with increased age were not transferable at all.
But since January 1, 2009, a strictly dened level of transferability between PHI providers is compulsory.
5market and free choice of doctors for those insured under the MHI. On the other hand, patients
may not accept their doctor's recommendation for convalescent care. After the application, the
MHI fund determines whether the preconditions for treatment are fullled and authorizes the
therapy. The wording of the preconditions can be found in the German social legislation, Social
Code Book V (SGB V, article 23 para. 1, article 40, para. 1). After authorization by the
MHI sickness fund, the prescribed treatment is provided in an approved medical facility under
contract with the MHI fund. These medical facilities are usually located in scenic rural villages
licensed by the state as Kurorte, or spa towns. For a village to be granted such a license, it
needs to fulll several conditions established in state legislation: pure air and location near the
seaside or mineral springs. The idea of providing patients a healthy change of environment is
integral to the treatment program.
2.2 The Cost Containment Policy Reforms
At the end of 1996, the German government implemented four health care reforms. The rst
three were designed to dampen the demand for convalescent care programs directly, based on
the suspicion of a high degree of moral hazard in the market for convalescent care. Prior to the
reform, experts estimated that around a quarter of all treatments prescribed were unnecessary
(Schmitz, 1996; Sauga, 1996). The fourth reform was designed to tackle moral hazard in the
decision to take sick leave and may have indirectly aected the demand for convalescent care as
well.
The rst reform doubled daily copayments. In West Germany, as of January 1, 1997, co-
payments for convalescent care therapies increased from DM 12 (e6.14) per day to DM 25
(e12.78) per day. In East Germany, the copayments increased from DM 8 (e4.09) to DM 20
(e10.23) per day. This reects an increase of 108 (150) percent.4 To illustrate how drastic this
copayment increase really was, I multiply the daily copayment rates by the average length of
stay according to the Federal Statistical Oce (German Federal Statistical Oce, 2010). The
absolute increase per treatment amounted to around e150 in East and West Germany. Before
the reform and in relation to the monthly net wages of those who received convalescent care in
my sample, the total copayment per treatment was 12 percent of the monthly net wage in East
Germany and 13 percent in West Germany. After the copayment increase, the total copayment
sum per treatment approximately doubled to 25 (East) and 24 (West) percent of the average
4 Passed on November 1, 1996, this law is the Gesetz zur Entlastung der Beitr age in der gesetzlichen Kranken-
versicherung (Beitragsentlastungsgesetz - BeitrEntlG), BGBl. I 1996 p. 1631-1633.
6monthly net wage.
The second reform reduced the standard length of convalescent care therapies from four to
three weeks. Only the medical personnel of the facility|after consultation with the sickness
fund|have the authority to approve deviations from the standard, legally codied, length of
therapy. Together with this reduction in therapy duration, waiting times were increased from
three to four years between treatments. Both reform elements|the reduced standard length of
therapy and the extended waiting period|are only eective conditional on the non-existence of
urgent medical reasons for treatment.
The third reform allowed employers to deduct two days of paid vacation for every ve days
that an employee was unable to work due to convalescent care therapy. The fourth reform
decreased statutory short-term sick pay from 100 to 80 percent of foregone gross wages. German
social legislation provides employees with paid leave for convalescent care treatments in addition
to paid vacation. Hence, one would expect that the latter two reforms, which allowed employers
more leeway in reducing paid leave, to have an eect on the demand for convalescent care.5
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1 displays the various subgroups of insured people who were aected dierently by the
four cost containment measures. Subgroup (1) comprises the vast majority of Germans: private-
sector employees who are insured under the MHI. They were aected by all reforms discussed
above. I dene them as Treatment Group 1.
In contrast, subgroups (2) to (5) were not aected by either the cut in statutory sick pay or
the cut in paid vacation. Non-working and self-employed people are not eligible for paid leave.
Public-sector employees and apprentices were exempted from the cuts in paid leave. However,
since they were insured under the MHI, they were aected by the rst two reforms. I call these
subgroups jointly Treatment Group 2.
Subgroups (6) to (9) were completely unaected by all legislative changes; they also consist
of the non-working, the self-employed, apprentices, and public sector employees, none of whom
were aected by the cut in paid leave. However, in contrast to Treatment Group 2, subgroups
(6) to (9) were insured under the PHI and, thus, reforms one and two did not apply to them
either. I dene subgroups (6) to (9) jointly as Control Group.6
5 Passed on September 15, 1996, this law is the Arbeitsrechtliches Gesetz zur F orderung von Wachstum und
Besch aftigung (Arbeitsrechtliches Besch aftigungsf orderungsgesetz), BGBl. I 1996 p. 1476-1479. The law went
into eect on October 1, 1996.
6 Private-sector employees insured under the PHI are not included in my working sample. They were only
7In total, I obtain three mutually exclusive subsamples that were aected dierently by the
reforms. Thus, in the empirical assessment, I use three distinct main models in which I compare
these subsamples to evaluate the eectiveness of the reforms. To this end, I generate three
treatment indicators that I will explain in more detail in Section 3.3 below.
3 Dataset and Variable Denitions
3.1 Dataset
The empirical analysis relies on micro data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP). The SOEP is an annual representative household survey that started in 1984 and
meanwhile includes more than 20,000 respondents. Wagner et al. (2007) provide further details.
Information on convalescent care treatments is only available for two post-reform years. Hence,
for the core analyses, I use data from the 1995 to 1999 waves, which include time-invariant
information, current information, and retrospective information about the previous year. Since
the dependent variable contains information about the calendar year prior to the interview, I
employ data on the years 1994 to 1998.7
I exclude respondents under the age of 18, who are exempted from copayments, and focus
on the subgroups dened in Table 1.
3.2 Dependent Variable and Covariates
The SOEP contains various questions about health insurance and the use of health care services.
The dependent variable convalescent care measures whether a respondent received convalescent
care at a health spa in the calendar year prior to the interview; it takes the value one if that
was the case, and zero if not. In other words, convalescent care measures the overall incidence
of convalescent care programs. The variable has been generated from the following question,
which was asked in every wave from 1995 to 1999: \Did you go to a health spa for convalescent
care in 199X?" In German, this question is even clearer because of the well-known umbrella
term Kur and the inpatient treatment this entails, at a location other than the recipient's place
aected by reforms three and four but not by the increase in copayments or in waiting times. However, in my
sample, they consist of only 150 respondents per year and, thus, I cannot use them to obtain precise estimates.
7 If the respondent was interviewed in two subsequent waves, e.g., in 1994 and 1995, I match time-variant data
from questions posed in the rst year dealing with the rst year with retrospective data obtained from questions
posed in the second year dealing with the rst year. For example, in 1995, respondents were asked about their
current health status and about their insurance status during the previous year. Hence, I use the 1994 data on
health status together with the 1995 data on insurance status if the respondent was interviewed in both years.
8of residence, a Kurort or spa town, which minimizes measurement errors. The fact that we do
not know the exact period of the therapy does not severely hamper the analysis, especially since
such treatments are usually not carried out over Christmas or New Year's. Hence, there should
be no doubt as to whether the therapy was in 1996 or in 1997.
While convalescent care can be considered a fairly good measure of the incidence of con-
valescent care treatments, the SOEP does not include a measure of their duration. However,
as explained above, the length of treatment is regulated by social law and deviations from it
are solely determined by the medical personnel and the MHI sickness fund, not by the patient.
Therefore, the empirical analysis focuses mainly on the eects on the incidence, which is the
key behavioral parameter in this setting and mainly inuenced by the patient. I use aggregated
administrative data on the average duration of treatments as an additional outcome measure in
descriptive assessments later on.
In my main empirical models, I make use of various control variables. These control variables
capture personal and family-related characteristics such as age, female, immigrant, partner,
and children. Moreover, I control for educational characteristics by using data on the highest
educational degree obtained. An important determinant of the demand for convalescent care
programs is the health status of the respondents, which I observe and control for (in form of
self-assessed health). I also include covariates that measure whether the person was employed
full-time, part-time, marginally, or not at all.8 I additionally control for gross monthly income.
To capture time-invariant regional characteristics, I make use of 15 state dummies. Regional
labor market dynamics are controlled for by the inclusion of the annual state unemployment
rate. Time trends are captured by year dummies. A list of the covariates, as well as its means
and standard deviations are found in Appendix A.
3.3 Treatment Indicators
In Section 2.2, I dene three mutually exclusive subsamples that were aected by dierent reform
elements, as shown in Table 1. In the next section, I make use of three distinct models to assess
the eectiveness of the various reforms. This requires three distinct treatment indicators for the
three models to compare the dierent subsamples.
T1 has a one for employees in Treatment Group 1 and a zero for respondents in the Control
8 Non-employment in particular may change quickly. Hence, the assignment of respondents to the treatment
and control group might be imprecise. Since the MHI/PHI status is very stable over time, the imprecision lies
between the dierent subgroups that were insured under the MHI as well as between the dierent subgroups that
were insured under the PHI.
9Group. By using this treatment indicator in Model 1, I compare those who were aected by all
reforms with those who were completely unaected to assess the net eect of all reforms jointly
on the demand for convalescent care programs.
T2 has a one for employees in Treatment Group 2 and a zero for respondents in the Control
Group. Thus, in Model 2, I contrast those who were aected by the rst two reforms with the
non-treated. In this model, my main intention is to evaluate the eectiveness of the copayment
doubling, i.e., the rst reform. In extended robustness checks, I will also assess the eect of the
second reform by means of Model 2.
T3 is used in Model 3, which assesses the eectiveness of the cuts in paid leave. For this
purpose I compare Treatment Group 1 with Treatment Group 2. Thereby I extract the eect
of the rst two reforms from the net reform eect to obtain the eect of the cuts in paid leave.
4 Estimation Strategy
4.1 Dierence-in-Dierences
I would like to measure how each reform aected the incidence of convalescent care programs.
Thinking of the policy intervention as a treatment, I t probit models of the form:




it  + t + s + it) (1)
where yit stands for the incidence of convalescent care programs, convalescent care. post97t
is a dummy that takes on the value one for post-reform years and zero for pre-reform years.
Depending on the model, Tit stands for one the three treatment indicators (see Section 3.3
above). The interaction term between the two dummies gives us the dierence-in-dierences
(DiD) estimator. To evaluate how the reform aected the outcome variable yit, henceforth, I
always compute and display the marginal eect of the interaction term
(:)
(post97T).9 (:) is the
cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution. By including additional
time dummies, t, I control for common time shocks. State dummies, s, account for permanent
dierences across the 16 German states along with the annual state unemployment rate that
9 Puhani (2008) shows that the advice of Ai and Norton (2004) to compute the discrete double dierence
2(:)
post97T is not relevant in nonlinear models when the interest lies in the estimation of a treatment eect in a





0  +++) which
is exactly what is calculated and presented throughout the paper.
10controls for changes in the tightness of the regional labor market and that is included in the
K 1 column vector s0
it. The other K  1 regressors are made up of personal controls including
health status, educational controls, and job-related controls as explained in Section 3.1.
4.2 Identication
The identication strategy relies on DiD estimation and hence on the assumption of a common
time trend of the outcome variable for treatment and control group in the absence of the policy
intervention. This assumption should hold conditional on all available covariates. In almost
all natural experiments and non-randomized settings, controlling for a rich set of covariates is
important since the control and treatment groups dier with respect to most of the observed
characteristics. This is also true in the present case, as Table 2 shows. For example, in com-
parison to the Control Group, Treatment Group 1 includes more females and immigrants, and
the employees are less educated. As compared to the Control Group, the people in Treatment
Group 2 are younger and more likely to be full-time employed.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As can be seen in Table 3, the most important driver of the demand for convalescent care
programs is health status. Not surprisingly, age also plays a role, as well as income. Immigrants
are less likely to receive convalescent care, probably because of information asymmetries.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Again, I would like to stress that the econometric specications adjust the sample composition to
the various personal, educational, and job-related characteristics of the respondents. Recall that
the health status of the respondents is observed and controlled for. Likewise, adjustments are
made for time eects, persistent dierences between states, and the annual state unemployment
rate.
The key identifying assumption, the common time trend assumption, is likely to hold. It as-
sumes the absence of unobservables that generate dierent outcome dynamics for the treatment
and control group. It is worth mentioning that a selection on observables story is very plausible
in the present setting. In the rst place, it is the MHI/PHI insurance status that determines
treatment (see Table 1). Almost all factors that determine whether respondents are insured
under the MHI or PHI|such as occupational status and income|are observed.
11A method to check the absence of distorting unobservable eects is to estimate placebo
regressions for years without a reform. I make use of this method in the next section.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the outcome variable for Treatment Group 1, 2 and the
Control Group over time.10 Even without the correction for observables, we observe parallel
evolution in the three groups during the pre-reform years. After the reform, the incidence of
convalescent care programs in the control group remained fairly stable, whereas we observe a
clear, distinct, and parallel decrease for the treatment groups.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Compositional changes within the treatment and control groups might have an impact on the
outcome variable. For example, in Treatment Group 2, the share of self-employed or public-
sector employees may change over time, which might aect or even produce the trend in the
outcome variable. However, the share of self-employed people within Treatment Group 2 only
uctuated between 5.31 percent and 5.86 percent between 1994 and 1998. The other subgroups
showed similar uctuations, also remaining very stable over time.
The drawbacks and limitations of DiD estimation are extensively debated. A particular
concern is the underestimation of OLS standard errors due to serial correlation in the case of
long time horizons as well as unobserved (treatment and control) group eects (Bertrand et al.,
2004; Donald and Lang, 2007; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). To address the serial correlation
issue, we focus on short time horizons. In addition, to provide evidence on whether unobserved
common group errors might be a serious threat to our estimates, in robustness checks, we cluster
on the stateyear (165 = 80 clusters) level (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
A crucial issue in most studies trying to evaluate policy reforms is, besides the absence of a
control group, selection into or out of the policy intervention. Selection issues are addressed since
I am in the unusual position of having a framework in which two almost totally independent
health care systems exist side by side, as explained in Section 2. On the one hand, this provides
a well-dened control group. On the other hand, I do not need to fear that reform-induced
selection has distorted the results, as there is virtually no switching between the MHI and
the PHI, and since all MHI-insured persons are covered by universal health plans. Due to
strict German regulations, a switch to the PHI was only legally allowed for a small fraction
of optionally MHI-insured individuals, and I am able to identify and exclude these cases when
10 As shown later, there is evidence that distorting eects play a role due to the announcement of the reform
at the end of 1995. Hence, the two uncontaminated pre-reform years, 1994 and 1995, are contrasted to the two
post-reform years, 1997 and 1998.
12running robustness checks. In my dataset, only 1.6 percent of those who were insured under
the MHI for at least one year switched to the PHI between 1994 and 1998. The rate did not
increase after the reform. Only 1.3 percent of those who were insured under the MHI in 1995
switched to the PHI in 1997 or 1998.
We need to consider the possibility of pull-forward eects. Convalescent care programs are
usually planned several months or even years in advance. Since the rst policy reform plans were
made public at the end of 1995 (Handelsblatt, 1995), it may be that a signicant portion of the
MHI-insured received their convalescent care therapy in 1996 instead of 1997. In the empirical
application, I check for anticipation eects.
Admittedly, it may have been that, due to rising awareness and increased political pressure,
the MHI funds were more restrictive in their authorization of therapy programs during the period
when the reforms were under political discussion, i.e., in 1996. As for anticipation eects that
might have been triggered by the insured, one can test for such eects by either excluding the
year 1996 from the analysis or by adding an interaction term between 1996 and the treatment
indicator to the analysis.
To be able to fully attribute changes in the incidence to changes in the demand for con-
valescent care programs, supply-side eects should not play a role. I found no indications of
supply-side constraints. In contrast, there are reports about the deepest crisis in the market
for convalescent care since the end of the Second World War (Handelsblatt, 1998). Dozens of
medical facilities and health spas closed and, hence, there is strong evidence of excessive supply.
This is also supported by ocial statistics stating that the utilized bed capacity of all facilities
strongly decreased, from 83.2 percent in 1996 to 62.3 percent in 1997 (German Federal Statistical
Oce, 2010).
Individuals insured under the MHI who were for some reason exempted from copayments
are not identiable. For example, people whose annual copayments for pharmaceuticals, health
care services, or medical devices exceeded a certain percentage of their disposable household
income could have applied for a case of hardship.11 However, at that time, the German Spa
Association claimed that the public was widely unaware of the exemption clauses. Therefore
this should not downwardly bias the results severely.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the third reform allowed employers to deduct two days of paid
vacation for every ve days that an employee was absent from work due to convalescent care
11 The usual threshold is 2 percent of disposable household income; for people with chronic diseases it is 1
percent.
13therapy. The fourth reform cut statutory (short-term) sick pay. In contrast to the other re-
forms, these two reforms are rather indirect cost containment measures since they decreased the
statutory minimum standards. Since employers are always free to provide fringe benets on top
of statutory requirements, reforms three and four simply increased employers' capacity to act.
I cannot observe which employers enforced these reforms strictly and passed on the decrease
in social law minimum standards one-to-one to their employees. Anecdotal evidence and polls
suggest that this might have been the case for about 50 percent of all potentially treated, i.e.,
private-sector employees (Ridinger, 1997; Jahn, 1998). Using all private-sector employees jointly
as treatment group, Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010) show that the cut in statutory short-term
sick pay signicantly reduced absenteeism. Since I apply the same approach in this setting, I
should be able to identify potential reform eects. Indeed, one of the main objectives of this
paper is precisely to evaluate the eectiveness of direct cost containment measures such as co-
payment increases, which apply to the entire population, as compared to indirect measures such
as decreasing legal minimum requirements, which only increase employers' options to regulate
work conditions at the rm level.
As a last point, it should be kept in mind that the identication strategy for the dierence-
in-dierences regression models is based on various specications. In total, I estimate three
distinct models, each of which compares dierent mutually exclusive and dierently aected
subsamples. In addition, I run various robustness checks, which enables me to automatically
cross-check the consistency and plausibility of the reform eects identied.
5 Results
Assessing the reforms' eectiveness
Table 4 shows the results for Model 1, 2, and 3. For each model, I display the \raw" dierence-
in-dierences (DiD) estimate as well as the estimates obtained from a Probit and an OLS
specication with the full set of covariates. The raw estimate represents what we see in Figure
1, which displays the unconditional trends for the various subsamples over time. All models
in Table 4 use an unbalanced panel, and each column represents one DiD model. DiD always
stands for the DiD estimate.
Model 1 makes use of the treatment indicator T1 and compares the pre-post-reform outcome
dierence for Treatment Group 1 to the pre-post-reform outcome dierence for the Control
14Group. Since Treatment Group 1 was aected by all four cost containment measures and
the Control Group by none, Model 1 estimates the net eect of all reforms on the incidence of
convalescent care programs. Column (1) gives the raw estimate, column (2) the Probit estimate,
and column (3) the OLS estimate under the inclusion of all covariates.
All three estimates for Model 1 yield signicantly negative reform eects on the incidence
of convalescent care programs. Moreover, all three estimates are fairly robust and lie within
the same condence intervals. The Probit and the OLS estimates in columns (2) and (3) are
especially close to one another, which suggest that functional form assumptions do not seem to
matter here. The pre-reform incidence of convalescent care programs for Treatment Group 1 is
0.0355, i.e., 3.55 percent. Relating the percentage point estimate (-0.0081) from my preferred
specication in column (2) to this pre-reform incidence rate suggests that all reforms jointly
decreased the demand for convalescent care programs by 22.8 percent.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Model 2 disentangles the eects of reforms one and two from the eects of reforms three and four.
Reform 1 doubled the daily copayments for convalescent care treatments. Reform 2 reduced the
legally codied standard length of the therapy and increased the waiting times between two
therapies. Reform 3 cut statutory sick leave, while Reform 4 cut paid vacation in case of work
absences due to convalescent care treatments. Model 2 contrasts those who were aected by
reforms one and two (Treatment Group 2) with those who were completely unaected by all
health reforms (Control Group). It employs the treatment indicator T2.
Again, all three estimates are similar in magnitude: all are negative and signicantly dierent
from zero, they are insensitive to the inclusion of covariates, and the results from the OLS and
Probit models barely dier. All DiD point estimates fall within the same condence intervals
than the ones in Model 1. The average pre-reform convalescent care incidence for Treatment
Group 2 was 0.0502, and hence the -0.0136 percentage point estimate of the Probit model in
column (5) translates into a reform-induced decrease of about -27.1 percent. This suggests that
reforms one and two are responsible for the decrease in demand for convalescent care programs.
In the robustness checks below, I provide evidence that the copayment doubling is probably
responsible for the bulk of this decrease. My ndings below suggest that the increase in waiting
times did not contribute much to the decrease and that the legally codied reduction in the
standard length of treatments merely reduced the average duration of treatments.
15Model 3 compares those aected by all four reforms (Treatment Group 1) to those aected
by reforms one and two (Treatment Group 2). I thereby assess the eects of reforms three and
four jointly, i.e., the cuts in paid leave. The results of Model 3 strongly conrm the ndings
of Model 1 and Model 2: columns (7) to (9) of Table 4 all yield point estimates that are very
close to zero and not statistically dierent from zero. The point estimates are even positive and
the standard errors are fairly tight. All in all, I do not nd any evidence that the cuts in paid
leave induced any signicant reduction in the demand for convalescent care programs. I have
two explanations for this nding. First, the cut in vacation days may not have been a binding
constraint, since many employees use all or part of their paid vacation for convalescent care.
Although entitled to take paid leave in addition to their paid vacation, many employees fear
negative job consequences, especially when unemployment rates are high. Second, the cut in
sick pay did not necessarily impose any limitation on the insured since their decision may have
been between either going to a convalescent care facility or simply staying home to recover. In
any case, the patient would have been on sick leave. If necessary, physicians usually recommend
treatments in spa towns, but if patients prefer to stay home on sick leave, their wishes are usually
respected.
The entire setup and the fact that all results are based on a comparison of three mutually
exclusive subsamples gives rise to another means of calculating the eects for Model 2 and the
rst two reforms: one can simply subtract the estimates from Model 3 from those from Model
1, i.e., subtract the eects of reforms three and four from the net eect of all reforms. It is easy
to see that this exercise yields very consistent alternative estimates for Model 2 that are almost
identical to the direct estimates in columns (5) and (6) (0.0097 for the Probit and 0.0141 for
the OLS model).
Robustness checks
Table 5 displays various robustness checks. In all cases, I focus on Model 2 and the Probit
specication with all covariates included.12
The rst column of Panel A is the same estimate as the one in column (5) of Table 4 (-0.0136).
This is the \standard" estimate. Column (2) excludes 1996 from the specication. Since the
copayment doubling was rst announced in December 1995, is it likely that pre-reform 1996 is
12 Here I focus on Model 2 since it includes more observations than Model 1 and therefore yields a more precise
estimation. Moreover, as such, I am able to run checks on the eectiveness of Reform 2. The results for Model 1
are very similar and available upon request from the author.
16contaminated by either pull-forward eects triggered by the insured or by supply-side eects
triggered by MHI sickness funds or the SPI. The MHI and SPI might have been more restrictive
in the authorization of treatments due to rising public awareness and political pressure. Indeed I
evidence of this. Omitting 1996, the DiD estimate shrinks slightly and translates into a decrease
of about 21 percent in demand. Column (3) also supports this result, since the short-run reform
eect obtained by comparing 1996 to 1997 is larger than the standard estimate in column (1)
and -0.018.13
Reform 2 increased the waiting period between treatments for MHI-insured from three to
four years. The last column in Panel A tests whether the increase in waiting times reduced the
incidence of convalescent care programs in the short run. The extension of the waiting period
did not apply to individuals needing urgent medical treatment. As detailed in Section 2, people
insured under the MHI have free choice of doctors, and there are almost no waiting times for
doctor appointments in Germany. Thus, it is unlikely that the increase in waiting times had
a substantial eect, since nding a doctor to write a prescription for treatment is not usually
dicult. The increase in the waiting period forced patients who received treatment in 1994
(1995) to wait until 1998 (1999) instead of 1997 (1998) in the absence of urgent medical reasons.
Thus, if the increased waiting period had a substantial impact, I would measure a stronger
reform eect for 1997 than for 1998. Column (5) of Table 5 shows that the reform eect in 1998
was not stronger than in 1997. I take this as evidence that the increased waiting period had no
signicant (short-term) eect on the demand for convalescent care.
The second element of Reform 2 was the reduction of the standard length of convalescent
care from four to three weeks. The standard length is codied in the Social Code Book and
applies universally to everyone who is insured under MHI. Exceeding the standard length is
only possible in case of urgent medical reasons. The decision to deviate from the legally codied
standard length can only be made by the attending physician after consulting the sickness fund
to authorize the prolongation. Since the SOEP does not include information on the length of
therapy, I cannot estimate the eect of the reduction in the standard length using a regression
model. However, ocial data is available on the average treatment length and the total number
of days spent in inpatient medical facilities for convalescent care treatments. These ocial
data represent average values for the whole of Germany. According to these data, the average
treatment length for all insured individuals decreased by almost 4 days from 31.0 (30.2) days in
1995 (1996) to 27.3 (26.4) days in 1997 (1998) (German Federal Statistical Oce, 2010). The
13 Please note that this is not true in a strict statistical sense since the condence intervals overlap.
17gures provide evidence that reducing the legally codied standard length was an eective tool
to reduce the real length of treatments. On the other hand, it is unlikely that reducing the
legal standard length of therapies had a substantial impact on the incidence of convalescent care
therapy, i.e., on the decision to go to a health spa. However, there is no way to empirically prove
this assumption.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Panel B of Table 5 presents additional robustness checks. The rst three columns prove that
treatment selection or panel attrition pose no threat to the results. In the rst column, I balance
the sample. In column (2), I weight the standard regression with the inverse probability that
a respondent did not drop out of my sample in the post-reform period. In the third column,
I exclude the only population group from my sample that could have selected themselves out
of the treatment. Only respondents who were optionally insured under the MHI system had
the possibility by opting out of the MHI. However, as noted before, opting out is essentially a
lifetime decision and therefore very rare. The DiD estimates from all three robustness checks are
close in size to the standard estimate in column (1) of Panel A and condence intervals largely
overlap. Each estimate is signicantly dierent from zero.
I exclude health variables in column (4) since the health status might be endogenous if
measured after a convalescent care therapy.14 The resulting estimate is very robust.
The last column in Panel B clusters standard errors on a higher aggregated level to test
whether the common group error structure might be a serious issue in this setting (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). As can be seen, there is no evidence of this.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
In Table 6, I display placebo regressions for Model 1, 2, and 3 and Probit as well as OLS speci-
cations. Placebo regressions are a common means to test the common time trend assumption.
Finding signicant reform eects for years without a reform would cast serious doubts on the
plausibility of the common time trend assumption. I use 1994 and 1995 as pseudo-reform years
14 Keep in mind that health status refers to the time of the interview, whereas the information about convalescent
care programs is sampled retrospectively for the previous calendar year. As explained at the beginning of Section
3, if a respondent was interviewed in two subsequent years, I match the current health status information in year
t0 with the convalescent care information from year t1 which refers to year t0. Since two-thirds of all interviews
were carried out between January and March, the health status is likely to have been measured before the medical
treatment.
18and, apart from that, the same setup as above. All twelve placebo regression estimates are close
to, and not signicantly dierent from, zero.
Reduction in health expenditures
Since reducing health expenditures was the main intention behind the policy reforms, I perform
a rough calculation of the decrease in public health expenditures using ocial data. Ocial
data is available on the total sum that was spent on convalescent care by the public social
insurance. Taking the simple dierence in expenditures in 1997/1998 vs. 1994/1995 yields a
total savings estimate of e835 million per year. This represents a decrease in spending of 12.5
percent (German Federal Statistical Oce, 2010). It should be kept in mind, however, that time
trends are included in this savings estimate.
As copayments were doubled, this reform raised additional revenues. However, ocial data
show that the total number of convalescent care days consumed decreased by 22 percent from
57 million in 1994/1995 to 44.5 million in 1997/1998 (German Federal Statistical Oce, 2010).
Multiplying each sum by the pre- and post-reform copayments and taking the dierence suggests
that increasing copayments not only eectively dampened the demand for convalescent care but
it also raised additional revenues of about e435 million per year.15
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, I empirically assess the eectiveness of dierent cost containment measures within
a unifying framework. In Germany, from 1997 on, four dierent health reforms were implemented
in order to dampen the demand for convalescent care therapies, to ght moral hazard, and to
decrease public health expenditures. At that time, experts claimed that around a quarter of all
convalescent care therapies were unnecessary (Schmitz, 1996; Sauga, 1996). In 1995, the German
public social insurance system spent e7.6 billion for 1.9 million convalescent care treatments.
Given the price elasticity of demand, convalescent care treatments can be considered good proxies
for health care demand in general (Wedig, 1988; Ziebarth, 2010).
Two of the health care cost containment measures evaluated applied solely, but universally,
to those insured with public health insurance. In Germany, public health insurance coexists
with private health insurance providers and strict legal regulations prevent switching between
15 Under the assumption that 18.8 percent of all therapies were undertaken by East Germans (German Federal
Statistical Oce, 2010) who were charged lower copayments (see Section 2.2 for details.)
19the two independent systems. Privately insured people were not aected by the two reforms
and concerns about treatment selection are addressed. Moreover, since the other two of the four
cost containment measures only applied to employees in the private sector, I am able to dene
various subsamples that were aected dierently by the reforms. Hence, my empirical ndings
are based on various dierence-in-dierences models that compare dierent mutually exclusive
subsamples.
The consistency of the ndings across the models, combined with the robustness checks,
allows me to conclude the following: rst, all reforms, combined, decreased the demand for
convalescent care therapies by about 20 percent. Second, doubling the daily copayments for
convalescent care treatments was by far the most eective cost containment measure. This
measure was responsible for the major part of the total decline in demand.
Third, descriptive evidence from ocial data suggests that a legally codied reduction in
the standard length of the therapies was eective in reducing the true length of the therapies.
Fourth, I nd no evidence that increasing the waiting times between two treatments had any
signicant eect on the decision to go for convalescent care.
Fifth, while all these policy measures applied universally to every publicly insured person, two
other measures evaluated here applied in a rather indirect way. They reduced statutory minimum
standards and increased the employers' options to set rm-specic employment conditions. The
rst of these indirect measures allowed employers to deduct two days of paid vacation for every
ve days that an employee was unable to work due to a convalescent care therapy. The second
cut statutory sick pay for which employees are eligible during convalescent care treatments. I
do not nd any evidence that these soft cost containment measures were eective in reducing
the demand for convalescent care programs. These ndings let me conclude that, sixth, indirect
measures that reduce statutory minimum conditions in the labor market are far less eective in
achieving a specic predetermined policy goal; direct measures that apply universally are much
more eective.
As a last exercise, using administrative data, I roughly calculate the reduction in public
health expenditures that was induced by all reforms. My back-of-the-envelope calculations
suggest that public health expenditures decreased by about e800 million (-12.5 percent) per
year due to the decline in the demand for convalescent care. Moreover, doubling the daily
copayments raised additional revenues of about e400 million per year.
The question to what degree such policy reforms succeed in reducing moral hazard or whether
20they actually lead to adverse health outcomes is dicult to quantify and is beyond the scope of
this paper. The overall decrease in demand ts well with the a priori claims by health experts
that a quarter of all pre-reform therapies were unnecessary. Although it is unlikely that moral
hazard was completely eliminated by the reforms, it is probable that the majority of the decrease
is due to a reduction in moral hazard and led to greater eciency in the convalescent care market.
On the other hand, if medically necessary therapies were not provided, this may have led to
adverse health outcomes and, in the long run, to even higher overall health expenditures.
Especially in the case of convalescent care, it is dicult to balance the prevailing degree of
moral hazard against potential long-term health improvements that may reduce health expen-
ditures and exert positive external eects. Some studies nd positive health eects of health
spa stays: patients with chronic diseases experienced reductions in pain and blood pressure,
and for a sample of employees, benecial eects on physical and particularly mental health,
such as improved sleep quality, were found (Sekine et al., 2006; Cimbiz et al., 2005; Constant
et al., 1998). While two of these studies are purely correlation-based, Constant et al. (1998)
estimate the short-term eects of a randomized trial on 224 patients with chronic lower back
pain. However, I am unaware of studies evaluating the long-term health eects of convalescent
care therapies. Assessing the long-term eects of health care on health outcomes as well as on
health expenditures is a promising eld for future research.
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24Figure 1: Incidence of Convalescent Care Programs















Private sector with MHI (1) yes yes yes yes
(Treatment Group 1)
Self-employed with MHI (2) yes yes no no
Non-working with MHI (3) yes yes no no
Public sector with MHI (4) yes yes no no
Apprentices with MHI (5) yes yes no no
(Treatment Group 2)
Self-employed with PHI (6) no no no no
Non-working with PHI (7) no no no no
Public sector with PHI (8) no no no no
Apprentices with PHI (9) no no no no
(Control Group)







Convalescent Care 0.032 0.045 0.032
Personal characteristics
Female 0.397 0.614 0.364
Age 37 47 45
Age squared 1,693 2,576 2,231
Immigrant 0.220 0.170 0.064
East Germany 0.246 0.309 0.134
Partner 0.798 0.671 0.745
Children 0.470 0.364 0.404
Good health 0.598 0.463 0.609
Bad health 0.106 0.201 0.110
Educational characteristics
Dropout 0.051 0.073 0.027
8 years of completed schooling 0.368 0.425 0.206
10 years of completed schooling 0.319 0.267 0.299
12 years of completed schooling 0.034 0.025 0.049
13 years of completed schooling 0.112 0.113 0.387
Certicate degree 0.116 0.077 0.027
Job characteristics
Full-time employed 0.831 0.197 0.671
Part-time employed 0.130 0.046 0.053
Marginally employed 0.040 0.010 0.008
Civil servant 0.000 0.010 0.427
Public servant 0.000 0.679 0.645
Self employed 0.000 0.056 0.258
Apprentice 0.000 0.057 0.012
Gross wage per month 1,860 618 2,126
Regional unemployment rate 11.706 12.317 11.031
N 23,530 4,261 37,758
In contrast to Appendix A, this table gives mean values separately for the treatment and control
groups. As detailed in Section 3, convalescent care is the overall incidence of convalescent care
programs.
27Table 3: Determinants of Convalescent Care
Variable Coecient Standard Error
Personal characteristics
Female (d) -0.0006 0.002
Age 0.0023*** 0.000
Age squared /1,000 -0.0169*** 0.003
Immigrant -0.0056** 0.002
East Germany 0.0017 0.007
Partner -0.0025 0.002
Children -0.0014 0.002
Good health -0.0230*** 0.002
Bad health 0.0398*** 0.003
Educational characteristics
8 years of completed schooling 0.0044 0.004
10 years of completed schooling 0.0100** 0.004
12 years of completed schooling 0.0106 0.007
13 years of completed schooling 0.0046 0.004
Other certicate 0.0045 0.004
Job characteristics
Full-time employed 0.0017 0.002
Part-time employed -0.0035 0.003
Marginally employed -0.0033 0.005
Gross wage per month/1,000 -0.0019** 0.001




* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; marginal eects, which are calculated at the
means of the covariates, are displayed. Dependent variable is convalescent care
and measures the incidence of all convalescent care programs. Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person identiers. Regression includes
state dummies. Left out reference categories are dropout and non-employed.
28Table 4: Assessing the Reforms' Eectiveness: Net Eect, Copayment Eect, and Eect of Cut in Paid Leave
Model 1: Net eect Model 2: Copayment eect Model 3: Cut in paid leave
Variable Raw Probit OLS Raw Probit OLS Raw Probit OLS
DiD -0.0129** -0.0081** -0.0096* -0.0165*** -0.0136** -0.0163*** 0.0035 0.0016 0.0045
(0.0057) (0.0041) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0031)
Treatment indicator 0.0046 0.0055*** 0.0106** 0.0193*** 0.0051* 0.0077* -0.0147*** 0.0010 -0.0058**
(T1, T2, or T3) (0.0042) (0.0020) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0026)
Post-reform dummy 0.0035 -0.0045 -0.0089 0.0035 -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0130*** -0.0149*** -0.0214***
(post97) (0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0066) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0063) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0037)
Year 1997 (d) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0012 0.0018 0.0015 0.0015
(0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0021)
Year 1996 (d) -0.0047** -0.0083** -0.0049** -0.0078** -0.0051*** -0.0069
(0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0028)
Year 1995 (d) -0.0021 -0.0036 -0.0022 -0.0035 -0.0020 -0.0028
(0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0025)
Educational covariates no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Job covariates no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Personal covariates no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Regional unempl. rate no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
State dummies no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
R-squared 0.0006 0.1217 0.0428 0.0012 0.0901 0.0339 0.0019 0.0956 0.0054
2/F-stat 6 793 12 16 992 19 36 1454.9678 8
N 27,791 27,791 27,791 42,019 42,019 42,019 61,288 61,288 61,288
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; in columns (2), (4), and (6), marginal eects are displayed; they are calculated at the means of the covariates except for T1 (T2, T3)(=1) and
DiD(=1). Dependent variable is convalescent care and measures the incidence of convalescent care programs (see Section 3). Every column represents one regression model; all
columns except for (2), (4), and (6) estimate OLS models. Columns (1) to (3) use T1, columns (4) to (6) use T2, and columns (7) to (9) use T3 (see Section 3 for further details).







DiD -0.0136** -0.0109* -0.0180* DiD98 -0.0115***














DiD -0.0153** -0.0155** -0.0125** -0.0144** -0.0144**
(0.0067) (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0057)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; marginal eects are displayed; they are calculated at the means of the covariates
except for T2(=1) and DiD(=1). Dependent variable is convalescent care and measures the incidence of convales-
cent care programs (see Section 3). Every cell represents one probit DiD model. All models are similar to the one
in column (5) of Table 4, i.e., they estimate the copayment eect using Model 2 and comparing Treatment Group
2 to the Control Group (see Section 3). Column (1) in Panel A is the standard DiD estimate, i.e., the estimate
in column (5) of Table 4. Column (2) in Panel A excludes the year 1996 from the regression and is the estimate
excluding anticipation eects. Column (3) in Panel A contrasts the year 1996 to the year 1997 and thus estimates
the reforms' short-run eect. Column (5) in Panel A shows the most exibel of all specications. Instead of inter-
acting the post-reform dummy post97 with the treatment indicator T2, it includes three alternative interaction
terms: Year1996T2 (DiD96), Year1997T2 (DiD97), and Year1998T2 (DiD98). Column (1) in Panel B uses
a balanced sample and thus excludes panel attrition eects. Column (2) in Panel B weights the regression with
the inverse probability that a person does not drop out of the sample in post-reform years. Column (3) in Panel
B excludes the only respondents that could have selected themselves out of the treatment, i.e., optionally MHI
insured people. Column (4) in Panel B excludes all health measures from the list of covariates. Column (5) in
Panel B clusters the standard errors at a higher aggregated level, i.e., the stateyear level (80 cluster). Standard
errors in all other models are adjusted for clustering on person identiers and are always in parentheses. All
models have 42,019 observations expect for Panel A column (2) (33,975 obs.) and column (3) (16,935) as well as
Panel B column (1) (30,625) and column (3) (38,962). For more details about the dierent model specications
and the interpretation of the results, please see main text.Table 6: Placebo Reform Estimates
Model 1: Net eect Model 2: Copayment eect Model 3: Cut in paid leave
Variable Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
DiD95 0.0015 0.0004 0.0052 0.0058 -0.0029 -0.0058
(0.0055) (0.0068) (0.0076) (0.0068) (0.0026) (0.0039)
DiD94 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0013 0.0045 -0.0004 -0.0037
(0.0050) (0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0026) (0.0040)
Educational covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional unempl. rate yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; in columns (1), (3), and (5), marginal eects are displayed; they are calculated at the means of the covariates except
for T1 (T2, T3)(=1) and DiD94 (DiD95)(=1). All columns but (2), (4), and (6) estimate OLS models. The dependent variable is convalescent care
and measures the incidence of convalescent care programs (see Section 3). Every cell represents one regression model. Columns (1) and (2) use
T1, columns (3) and (4) use T2, and columns (4) and (5) use T3 (see Section 3 for further details). Each model in columns (1) and (2) has 27,791
observations; each model in columns (3) and (4) has 42,019 observations and columns (5) and (6) are based upon 61,288 observations. All models
compare the same groups of (pseudo) treated and (pseudo) non-treated respondents than the non-placebo models. DiD94 (DiD95) is an interaction
term between the treatment indicator (T1, T2, or T3) and the year 1994 (1995). Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on
person identiers.Appendix A
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Working Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variable
Convalescent care 0.0393 0.1943 0 1 65,549
Covariates
Treatment Indicators
T1 0.8467 0.3603 0 1 27,791
T2 0.8986 0.3019 0 1 42,019
T3 0.3839 0.4863 0 1 61,288
Personal characteristics
Female 0.5195 0.4996 0 1 65,549
Age 44 17 18 99 65,549
Age squared 2,236 1,625 324 9,801 65,549
Immigrant 0.1811 0.3851 0 1 65,549
East Germany 0.2751 0.4465 0 1 65,549
Partner 0.7214 0.4483 0 1 65,549
Children 0.4045 0.4908 0 1 65,549
Good health 0.521 0.4996 0 1 65,549
(best 2 of 5 categories)
Bad health 0.1607 0.3672 0 1 65,549
(worst 2 of 5 categories)
Educational characteristics
Drop out 0.062 0.2412 0 1 65,549
8 years of completed schooling 0.3905 0.4879 0 1 65,549
10 years of completed schooling 0.2878 0.4528 0 1 65,549
12 years of completed schooling 0.0298 0.1701 0 1 65,549
13 years of completed schooling 0.1305 0.3369 0 1 65,549
Other certicate 0.0878 0.2829 0 1 65,549
Job characteristics
Full-time employed 0.455 0.498 0 1 65,549
Part-time employed 0.0767 0.2662 0 1 65,549
Marginally employed 0.0204 0.1414 0 1 65,549
Gross wage per month 1,162 1,301 0 51,129 65,549
Regional unemployment rate 12.0 3.9 7 21.7 65,549
32